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In the Passenger Cases1 Chief Justice Taney expressed his will-
ingness always to reconsider his Court’s constitutional doctrines.2 In
Dickerson v. United States3 the Court declined to do as Chief Justice
Taney said he would have done and adhered to Miranda v. Arizona4
without saying whether a majority of the Justices believed Miranda to
have been correctly decided as an original matter.5
Suppose that some time between the Taney and Rehnquist
Courts Congress had adopted a statute purporting to codify Chief
Justice Taney’s suggestion by providing that the Supreme Court shall
depart from its precedents whenever it believes them to be incorrect.
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1. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
2. Chief Justice Taney noted:
I do not, however, object to the revision of [a question he had believed decided by
earlier cases], and am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this
court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to dis-
cussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial
authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which
it is supported.
Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
3. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. “Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were
we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against
overruling it now.” Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice Scalia
asserted that only stare decisis was propping up Miranda. The Court, he maintained, could not
say, “‘We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings
or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States.’ It cannot say that, because a
majority of the Court does not believe it.” Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Would the Court have been obliged to decide whether Miranda was
right in the first place, or would the majority properly have disre-
garded such a statute as beyond congressional power and decided for
themselves what the rule of stare decisis should be?
The question of congressional power over the norms of stare de-
cisis also arises in more mundane contexts. A decade ago, the Federal
Courts Study Committee suggested that in order to deal with conflicts
among the circuits, the Supreme Court be empowered to refer a case
presenting a question as to which a conflict had arisen to an en banc
sitting of a court of appeals that had not yet reached the question.
According to the proposal, the decision of that court of appeals
should set nationwide precedent.6 Whether Congress validly could
legislate that rule of stare decisis depends in large part on the extent
of its power over precedent.
Despite the practical and theoretical interest of this question, it
seems to have received very little scholarly attention.7 A powerful re-
cent study of constitutional questions related to precedent deals with
this issue in one sentence: “Moreover, I presume that the Necessary
and Proper Clause allows Congress to command the federal courts to
follow the precedents established by other courts.”8 This Article will
attempt to fill that gap. I argue that Congress has substantial author-
ity to legislate concerning the rules of precedent in federal court. My
conclusion, put briefly, is that Congress at least may adopt any norm
of stare decisis that a court reasonably could recognize. Congress,
therefore, may adopt or modify rules of precedent in pursuit of accu-
6. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 126 (1990). The Committee was appointed by the Chief Justice, at the instance of
Congress, to deal with questions concerning the workload of the federal judiciary. Its members
were drawn from the federal bench, Congress, the executive branch, and the bar. Congress has
not yet enacted legislation to improve the federal judiciary’s ability to deal with intercircuit con-
flicts.
7. Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen recently broke the academic silence on this topic in
Abrogating Stare Decisis By Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effects of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). Despite the seeming similarities, Professor Paulsen’s article
and this one have relatively little overlap. He does not consider the possibility that the norms of
stare decisis are given to rather than made by the judiciary, whereas I start from the assumption
that they are. Paulsen addresses “[t]he proposition that the judiciary has sole and exclusive
power to determine the stare decisis weight to be accorded its own decisions” and rejects it,
concluding that “‘[t]he judicial Power’ of Article III simply does not include a plenary constitu-
tional power, or inviolable institutional privilege, to make what are concededly rules of policy.”
Id. at 1570. I agree with Professor Paulsen’s answer to the question he poses but think that it is
not the main question.
8. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 838 (1994) (footnote omitted).
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racy, economy, stability, and predictability in the law—the considera-
tions the courts traditionally have considered when they have formu-
lated such norms. I will not address whether Congress has a truly ple-
nary power that would enable it to adopt any rule it likes concerning
the courts’ treatment of their prior cases.9
The first question is whether the federal courts’ norms of prece-
dent are the kind of legal rule that is susceptible to alteration by ordi-
nary legislation. My answer is yes. Most of them are federal common
law, or as it was once called, general law, and at least one seems to be
derived from a statute. That conclusion takes the argument only part
of the way. Congressional action is valid only if it rests on an enumer-
ated constitutional power, and Congress may not, in the form of leg-
islation, invade the executive or judicial powers. The relevant enu-
merated power here comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
under which Congress may pass laws that carry into execution the
other two powers.10 Such a congressional authority poses no threat to
the separation of powers, or at least no more of a threat than the nec-
essary and proper power inevitably does. That threat might be serious
were Congress empowered to legislate with an eye to determining the
doctrines according to which the courts decide cases. The necessary
and proper power, however, authorizes legislation that is based on
systemic considerations that are divorced from particular doctrinal re-
sults and hence would not enable Congress to control outcomes in ar-
eas where it may not legislate the substantive rule.
In a largely uncharted field like this one, the first explorer can
expect to provide only a basic map. This Essay presents what I be-
lieve to be the best way to analyze the question of congressional
power over precedent and the answer that results from that analysis. I
cannot hope to develop the definitive treatment of that question, and
certainly do not aspire even to sketch answers to the many further
questions that arise if my basic claim is correct. I do hope, however, to
provide a useful traveler’s report from a hitherto undiscovered coun-
try.
9. I do not consider whether Congress has any power to legislate concerning rules of
precedent applied by state courts.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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I.  THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THE RULES OF PRECEDENT
Nothing in the nature of the rules of precedent keeps Congress
from legislating on this subject. Congress may not alter constitutional
rules, because the Constitution is hierarchically superior to statutes.11
When legislating within the scope of its enumerated powers, however,
Congress may, in general, deal freely with law from other sources be-
cause federal statutes are the supreme law of the land.12 It may dis-
place state law, for example.
Section I.A begins by arguing that the norms of stare decisis fall
into the category of authoritative legal rules. Such rules have a
source, whether that source be the Constitution or elsewhere. Section
I.B maintains that the rules of stare decisis applied by the federal ju-
diciary do not derive from the Constitution. Section I.C argues that
norms of precedent used by the federal courts mainly consist of gen-
eral law, or federal common law in contemporary terminology. At
least one of those norms appears to rest on judicial interpretations of
the statutes that structure the federal courts. Pursuant to its granted
powers, Congress may alter or displace the general law, and of course
it may change rules that arise from its statutes.
A. The Nature of Rules of Precedent
1. Rules of Precedent as Authoritative Legal Rules. Much of this
Article is concerned with identifying the place of stare decisis norms
in the American legal hierarchy. Legal norms are hierarchically
arranged in part because of Article VI of the Constitution, which
establishes the supremacy of federal law with respect to state law and
nonfederal law generally, including both foreign law and general or
common law that is not the work of any identifiable sovereign,
11. The standard citation for this proposition, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), also reminds us that some constitutional rules may in a sense be altered by Congress in
that they represent defaults that the legislature is empowered to change. See id. at 179. Article
III, for example, sets out the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court while giving Congress
power to make exceptions to it. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Similarly, the Twentieth Amendment
sets January 3rd as the congressional meeting date, subject to statutory alteration. See id.
amend. XX, § 2.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. The qualifier in the text reflects the fact that Congress often
may not alter the legal consequences of acts of the other two branches that change legal rela-
tionships; thus, it may not undo what the president does with a pardon. See United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141 (1872).
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domestic or foreign.13 Implicit in the Constitution is its own
hierarchical superiority to other forms of federal law.14 In order to
know whether Congress may alter or displace the existing norms of
stare decisis, it is necessary to know where they fit in that ordering, or
to put it another way, to know where they come from.
Asking that question assumes that stare decisis norms have a
place in the hierarchy, that they are one of the kinds of law that the
federal courts apply when they decide cases. This Essay rests on that
claim, and, despite its axiomatic feel, the premise requires some de-
fense because there is an alternative way of thinking about precedent.
To see the alternative, it is useful to consider a rule that I will argue is
both importantly similar to and importantly different from the norms
of stare decisis. This is the Constitution’s requirement that any con-
viction for treason against the United States rest on confession in
open court or the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.15
The two-witnesses rule has three features that are important for
this Essay. First, it comes straight from the Constitution, and hence
Congress may not displace it. Second, it is higher-order in that it does
not itself provide a rule for conduct, but rather governs the applica-
tion of other rules. In this case, the other rule is the definition of trea-
son, which also comes from the Constitution.16 When the treason rule
is applied in a criminal proceeding, the two-witnesses rule controls.
Finally, and relevant here, the two-witnesses rule is authoritative in
that the courts must apply it, even when in their judgment it fails to
achieve its purpose. A judge in a treason trial may be utterly con-
vinced that the defendant is guilty and that the case has not been
trumped up by the government, but if there are not two witnesses to
the same overt act, the defendant goes free. Cases would come out
differently were the two-witnesses requirement not authoritative but
instead a generalization that the courts usually followed because it
was usually reliable. Were the two-witnesses principle of the latter
type, a judge would not follow it when convinced that the defendant
was guilty, because it would have no independent force of its own.
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
14. An attempt to identify more precisely just where the Constitution embodies that as-
sumption is found in John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Re-
view, 84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998).
15. “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
16. “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” Id.
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Norms of stare decisis, I will assume, have the same kind of inde-
pendent force as the two-witnesses rule. If they do not, then to say
that American courts follow them is gravely to impeach their adher-
ence to the rule of law. Norms of precedent have decisive force pre-
cisely when the court would have come out the other way had it not
been following precedent. If principles of stare decisis are authorita-
tive legal norms, then for a court to follow them is by definition not
lawless, and the result is no more peculiar than what happens when a
treason defendant is acquitted under the two-witnesses rule even
though the court believes the defendant guilty. But if norms of prece-
dent are based on judicial policy judgments that do not have an
authoritative source, then to follow precedent is to apply the wrong
legal rule, not because some higher-order legal rule requires it, but
because the court thinks that doing so is a good idea.17
Courts frequently do characterize stare decisis as a policy,18 but I
read such statements to mean two things. First, the rule is not abso-
lute.19 Second, the norms are influenced by and reflect policy consid-
erations, as does the common law generally. When judges say they
are bound by precedent, I take them to mean that they are following
actual rules and not ignoring the law because they believe that ap-
17. Treating rules of precedent as authoritative legal rules is one consequence of a funda-
mental assumption that I make about the judicial function, an assumption that leads to a par-
ticular account of the process often called judicial legislation. I assume that the judicial function
is to find the facts concerning particular disputes and apply rules of law to those facts. A court
may need to make policy judgments in order to do that, either because the applicable norm in-
structs it to do so or because that norm is unclear in its application, but those policy judgments
are part of the adjudicative process and are made within the limits given by the norms being ap-
plied. As Justice Scalia says, judges make law, but “they make it as judges make it, which is to
say as though they were ‘finding’ it.” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Finding it means deriving it from some pre-existing norm, how-
ever open-ended that norm may be. Hence, the concept of judicial legislation is a metaphor, an
account of a way in which the process of adjudication resembles the process of legislation. Leg-
islatures, by contrast, make law in the primary literal sense of selecting a norm on the basis sim-
ply of its merits and prescribing it ex nihilo.
Courts make law in the manner I attribute to them any time the applicable norms are
not clear. Some courts, but by no means all, also make law in the sense of setting precedents
that will be treated as authoritative by later decisionmakers including later courts. This form of
judicial legislation, however familiar it may be, does not invariably accompany the process of
adjudication. Federal district courts do not legislate in this sense, nor do courts in legal systems
that do not treat cases as authoritative.
18. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and
questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in
its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.”).
19. See id.
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plying it would be undesirable.20 By assuming that the rules of stare
decisis are authoritative legal rules, this Essay also puts to one side
the argument that it is illegitimate for federal courts to follow prece-
dent in applying federal law.
2. Rules of Precedent as Norms Internal to Judicial
Decisionmaking. In order to understand the source of norms of stare
decisis, it is first necessary to be more precise about the way in which
courts become obliged to follow precedent. Courts may be required
to do so because judicial precedent is part of the primary law that
governs the conduct of parties in litigation. On the other hand, rules
of precedent may operate like rules of evidence, which govern the
internal decisionmaking of the courts. To be sure, private people will
often be intensely interested in the courts’ operating procedures, as
Mafiosi are interested in the evidentiary rules of attorney-client
privilege. But the two different kinds of rules have different sources
and different implications.
The rules of precedent could bind everyone, not just the courts,
for either of two reasons. First, it could be that cases are literally law,
the way statutes are law. Despite the implication of the phrase “case
law,” for example, it is quite unlikely that cases are law in the Ameri-
can constitutional system. If courts follow precedent because judicial
decisions are law, then they should not follow it in cases involving the
Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties. As Gary Lawson has
pointed out, under the Supremacy Clause written federal law is supe-
rior to everything else, including by implication judicial opinions.21
Even if such opinions can be characterized as laws of the United
20. To say that rules of precedent are authoritative legal rules, and hence to some extent
opaque to the reasons for having them, is of course not to say that they are completely opaque.
They are not, in fact, completely opaque, and hence to a substantial degree directly reflect the
policies that underlie them. Nor are they without authority because courts in formulating them
consider those policies, just as legislatures do when they formulate legal rules; courts do that
when they formulate the law of contracts, but they nevertheless regard contract law as binding
on them. Probably the most famous account of the nature and limits of judicial legislation comes
from Justice Holmes: “[J]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they
are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could not say I think the
doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court.”
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Common law
judges at once follow and make law.
21. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23, 24 (1994). The Supremacy Clause provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
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States within the meaning of Article VI, they still cannot prevail over
the Constitution; when a law of the United States conflicts with the
Constitution, the latter wins. A court, therefore, would have to prefer
the Constitution as the court understands it to the earlier decision,
even though the earlier decision had the force of a law of the United
States, and there would be no stare decisis. In the hierarchy of federal
law, at least, talking about judicial decisions as the law is inaccurate
shorthand.
Second, it could be that judicial decisions, although not literally
law, are for the world at large conclusive gloss on whatever law is
relevant, including the Constitution. This thesis is not embarrassed by
the Constitution’s superiority, because gloss piggy-backs on the law
being glossed, and an interpretation piggybacked on the Constitution
is the supreme interpretation of the land. That would be so, not be-
cause of any rule specifically about the way courts are to operate, but
because of a general principle applicable to all who seek to follow the
law.
Whatever may be the merits of the proposition that judicial in-
terpretations are conclusive gloss for all legal actors, this proposition
cannot be the source of the norms of precedent in anything like the
form with which we are familiar. Assume that judicial decisions do
indeed authoritatively interpret the law they apply. District courts
apply law and decide cases just as much as does the Supreme Court.
So when the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia decides an issue under a federal statute, every other court in
the country, up to and including the Supreme Court of the United
States, must follow its conclusion in later cases. That would be true if
judicial constructions of the primary law themselves had the status of
primary law, but precedent does not work that way in America.
It may seem that I am being uncharitable to the conclusive gloss
hypothesis. Surely it entails some adjustment for the internal struc-
ture of the judiciary. One adjustment is to say that the principle ap-
plies only to decisions of the highest court. If that is so, then the prin-
ciple cannot account for norms of precedent in general, for it cannot
tell which district courts, if any, must follow the Fourth Circuit’s
cases. Another adjustment, perhaps superficially attractive, is to say
that courts produce conclusive gloss only “within their jurisdiction,”
or something like that. A court’s jurisdiction, according to this view,
includes only those subject to its authority, which in turn includes pri-
vate people whose cases it can decide and other courts that it can re-
verse. The Fourth Circuit, by this reasoning, produces conclusive
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gloss for people and district courts in Maryland, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, but for no one else. The
Supreme Court conclusively glosses federal law because it can decide
any case with a federal question, reversing any lower court if neces-
sary.
This refinement still does not work. It gives nonjudicial actors a
rule they cannot follow because it can subject them to inconsistent in-
terpretations from different courts. An issue of federal law can end up
being litigated in more than one court. Both the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court of Virginia must apply the Constitution’s search
and seizure rules but neither can reverse the other.22 Virginia’s highest
court can decide a search and seizure question one way and the fed-
eral court of appeals can decide the very same legal question the
other way. If the Supreme Court of the United States denies certio-
rari in both cases, the Virginia State Police will be left with inconsis-
tent pieces of supposedly conclusive constitutional interpretation.
The problem here is that under the norms of precedent with
which we are familiar, the authority of a judicial decision depends in
part on the appellate structure of the courts. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit usually makes law for district courts
within the Fourth Circuit, but never for district courts in the Eighth
Circuit. The Fourth Circuit in general can reverse district courts in
North Carolina but not in Iowa. The Fourth Circuit does not make
patent law even for district courts in North Carolina, however, be-
cause it cannot reverse district courts in North Carolina on patent
questions. Cases involving such questions are appealable only to the
Federal Circuit.23 This structure of rules about judicial lawmaking is
hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that precedent is authoritative
because judicial decisions are in general sources of primary obligation
and entitlement. It is, however, quite natural if one believes that the
norms of precedent are part of the internal operating procedures of
the courts. If they are, then one would expect those norms to interact
with other aspects of those internal operations.
22. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the state courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1994), but the federal courts of appeals do not, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-96 (1994).
23. The allocation of appellate jurisdiction among the regional courts of appeals and be-
tween them and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is found in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1294 and 1295. Under the latter, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction (with stated
exceptions) over all cases from the federal district courts where “the jurisdiction of that court
was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title,” 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) (1994), which
gives the district courts jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress re-
lating to patents,” id. §1338(a).
HARRISON IN FINAL READ
512 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:503
Courts do not follow precedent because other courts conclusively
gloss the law. Courts can conclusively gloss the law because other
courts follow precedent. Appellate hierarchies and rules of stare deci-
sis logically precede judicial lawmaking, not the other way around.
Rules of stare decisis thus seem not to result from principles
about the status of judicial decisions that apply to the world at large.
That leaves the possibility that precedent results from principles of
reasoning and decision specific to courts. As internal rules of judicial
reasoning, norms of stare decisis closely resemble rules of evidence,
through which courts perform the factfinding part of their function.
Rules of evidence are the lenses through which courts look at the
world. Sometimes they distort reality: maybe the one point about
constitutional law most Americans know is that the exclusionary rule
keeps out probative, often conclusive, evidence of guilt.
As mentioned above, rules of evidence can have that effect pre-
cisely because they are authoritative legal rules, and not just rules of
thumb. Authoritative rules to some extent depart from the reasons
for having them. Hearsay, for example, often has serious reliability
problems. But some hearsay is in fact reliable. Not all reliable hear-
say, however, comes within one of the exclusions or exceptions, which
is to say that sometimes the rule operates where its rationale does
not.24 Moreover, the rules of evidence reflect some considerations that
have nothing to do with factfinding. Testimonial privileges are a
leading example. Conversations between attorney and client are not
kept out because they are unlikely to lead to truth. On the contrary,
that is exactly where they are likely to lead and that is the problem
with them: too much truth in adjudication would mean too little good
legal advice.
Rules of precedent are like rules of evidence for questions of law
rather than fact. They give special, sometimes dispositive, strength to
one particular indicator of what the law requires. Precedent means
that prior decisions are taken as correct, or correct unless shown oth-
erwise to some requisite degree, much as an evidentiary presumption
means that some fact is taken to be true, or true unless clearly shown
not to be. Moreover, norms of stare decisis have both of the features
24. In 1961, then-Professor Weinstein described and criticized the rule-like nature of the
regime under which hearsay is excluded subject to categorical exceptions of inclusion. See Jack
B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961). He explained that hear-
say is frequently unreliable, see id. at 334-36, noted that some hearsay is reliable, see id. at 336-
37, and pointed out that the system of categorical exceptions still excludes some reliable state-
ments, see id. at 337-38.
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just noted about rules of evidence. First, they sometimes fail the pur-
pose of accurately interpreting the law. Sometimes the earlier court
was wrong. Second, they reflect considerations other than just the
correct resolution of legal issues. In particular, stare decisis is justified
on the need for uniformity and stability (the former applies especially
to horizontal, the latter to vertical, precedent).25 Having a uniform
and stable answer is not the same as having the right answer.
B. Precedent and the Constitution
1. Text and Structure. The first and most serious problem with
the suggestion that the Constitution itself establishes rules of
precedent is that it does not even come close to mentioning the
subject. It contains other rules of judicial procedure, and indeed of
evidence, but does not mention stare decisis.26
The Constitution does call one federal court supreme and all
other federal courts inferior. Professor Evan Caminker, in the most
serious analysis of the constitutional sources of precedent so far, in-
fers from the terminology that lower federal courts are agents of the
Supreme Court, as lower executive officers are agents of the presi-
dent, and that they are therefore required to follow the Court’s
precedents.27 He argues that it is very hard to account for the distinc-
tion between supreme and inferior courts on any other hypothesis.
While Caminker’s reasoning is powerful, it is not conclusive on
the point he addresses, and his conclusion does not embrace the en-
tire field of precedent. Indeed, it may create another expresio unius
problem for other forms of precedent, insofar as the Constitution
bothers to create this one and no other. In any event, the argument
from “supreme” and “inferior” encounters difficulties, some of which
Caminker discusses, though I think he undervalues them.
At the outset, the claim that inferior federal courts are agents of
the Supreme Court must struggle with the language of Article III,
which vests the judicial power in both.28 Article III’s Vesting Clause is
25. Vertical stare decisis refers to the rule that courts must follow the precedents of courts
above them in the appellate hierarchy. Horizontal stare decisis refers to the rule that a court
must follow its own precedents.
26. The jury trial provisions of Article III and the Sixth Amendment are procedures, and
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a rule of evidence.
27. See Caminker, supra note 8, at 828-34.
28. “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST.
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in sharp contrast with that of Article II, which grants the executive
power to the president alone.29 That aspect of Article II is the primary
textual prop leaned on by those who argue that the president must be
able to control lower executive officers: the power such officers exer-
cise is the president’s.30 But the power that lower federal courts exer-
cise, says the Constitution, is their own.
Article III, moreover, provides that Congress may make excep-
tions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Most com-
mentators, even those who believe that some federal court must exer-
cise all of the Article III jurisdiction, generally agree that the excep-
tions power enables Congress to make decisions by inferior federal
courts final.31 The upshot is that whole areas of law may go for dec-
ades without a Supreme Court decision. Federal criminal law could
do so in the nineteenth century, when the Court, as a general matter,
had no appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases in the lower federal
courts.32 This relationship between the supreme and inferior federal
courts does not look like that of agent and principal.
Finally, this account of vertical stare decisis rests on a very par-
ticular kind of agent-principal relationship, one that operates through
the binding force of the Supreme Court’s opinions. The Court appar-
ently has no authority to direct lower courts through extrajudicial
pronouncements in advance of actual cases in the way that the Com-
mander-in-Chief may direct the military in advance of conducting op-
erations. Yet the Constitution makes no provision for the production
or publication of such opinions. It may seem obvious to us that the
Supreme Court will issue opinions that will become available to
bench and bar, but it was not at all obvious when the Constitution was
art. III, § 1.
29. “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
30. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 230 (1985). Amar argues that some federal
court must be able finally to decide every case to which the federal judicial power extends under
the case-denominated heads of jurisdiction in Article III. Whether that is the Supreme Court or
one of the inferior courts, however, is up to Congress, because the Constitution assumes parity
among federal judges. See id.
32. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805). Questions of criminal law
could come before the Court when the judges of a Circuit Court divided in opinion and certified
the question. See ALFRED CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION AND
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME, CIRCUIT, AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 21
(1842).
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adopted.33 A document that meant to set up a principal that would
communicate with its agents only in this stylized fashion likely would
have said something about its chosen and highly specialized mode of
communication.
The more plausible reading is thus that lower courts are inferior
in that they may be subjected to the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction and are so subjected by the Constitution’s default rule. The
Supreme Court is supreme in that it must be the court of last resort.
The argument based on the Court’s adjective has the advantage
that it gives stare decisis a textual basis. Otherwise the Constitution
says nothing that obviously bears on precedent one way or another. It
is natural to respond that my statement shows a lack of appreciation
for the text’s implications. Courts have the judicial power, goes the
response, and judicial power simply brings with it rules of precedent.
Moreover, while the Constitution does not say anything about this in
so many words, it does deal with the structure of the judiciary, both
by prescribing such rules to a certain extent and by giving Congress
the power to complete the system. On this account, rules of precedent
follow more or less automatically from rules of judicial structure, so
they are in effect given by the Constitution even though not ex-
pressed. There may be some details to be worked out, but constitu-
tional law is like that.
In fact, there are two serious difficulties with the suggestion that
rules of precedent are implied by the Constitution’s rules about the
structure of the judiciary. One is that there are a lot of details to be
worked out, and the Constitution generally gives us no guidance
about how to approach them. Moreover, on several points, standard
doctrine is contrary to what one would infer from the Constitution if
one believed that it provided rules of stare decisis.
Consider first horizontal precedent, which operates within
courts.34 It raises many questions that one is hard pressed to answer
on the basis of the Constitution. Most basic is the question whether
the rule of stare decisis is absolute, and if not, when a prior case is to
be overruled. Judicial debates about the force of precedent are not
conducted with an eye on any particular constitutional text or identi-
33. As Caminker notes, in the early days Supreme Court opinions were delivered seriatim
and were not regularly published because there was no official reporter. See Caminker, supra
note 8, at 833-34 & n.69. The only written opinions referred to by the Constitution are those of
the heads of executive departments, which the president may call for. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1.
34. See supra note 25.
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fiable aspect of the structure the text creates. A leading current ex-
ample is Payne v. Tennessee,35 which overruled two earlier cases that
had severely limited the use of “victim impact statements” at the sen-
tencing phase in capital cases.36 While the majority and dissent
clashed sharply on the strength of stare decisis and on the factors that
should influence overruling, the debate turned on policy considera-
tions rather than specific features of the Constitution. The Chief Jus-
tice, speaking for the majority, explained that adherence to precedent
is generally good because it promotes evenhandedness, predictability,
consistency, and reliance, as well as actual and perceived judicial in-
tegrity. Nevertheless, he maintained that the rule is not absolute but
rather a matter of sound policy.37 Justice Marshall wrote the primary
dissent, an impassioned opinion that begins with a harsh accusation:
“Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s decisionmak-
ing.”38 He agreed that stare decisis is not absolute but nevertheless
had substantial force, appealing not to anything in particular in the
Constitution but to the values of the rule of law itself.39
While debates in the Supreme Court have the highest profile, the
complex structure of the inferior federal courts raises important ques-
tions, answers to which are hard to attribute to the Constitution. One
basic issue is whether horizontal stare decisis in the inferior courts
operates throughout each level of the appellate hierarchy or in some
more limited fashion. Should the Sixth Circuit be bound by the Ninth
Circuit’s precedents? The current answer is no.40 On the other hand,
the rule may have been the opposite a hundred years ago.41 One could
35. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
36. Id. at 830 (overruling both Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)).
37. See id. at 827-30.
38. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 848-50.
40. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (noting the
rule that the decisions of a circuit are not binding upon other circuits).
41. In Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1895), the Eighth Circuit noted:
It is a principle of general jurisprudence that courts of concurrent or co-ordinate ju-
risdiction will follow the deliberate decisions of each other, in order to prevent un-
seemly conflicts, and to preserve uniformity of decision and harmony of action. This
principle is nowhere more firmly established or more implicitly followed than in the
circuit courts of the United States. A deliberate decision of a question of law by one
of these courts is generally treated as a controlling precedent in every federal circuit
court in the Union, until it is reversed or modified by an appellate court.
Id. at 790. Although that opinion was delivered by one of the then-recently-formed circuit
courts of appeals, it appears to have referred to the practice of the federal trial courts that had
long gone by the name of Circuit Courts and still did so for a while after the circuit courts of ap-
HARRISON IN FINAL READ
2000] POWER OF CONGRESS OVER PRECEDENT 517
go either way on this question for reasons of policy, but the Constitu-
tion says nothing about the structure of the lower federal courts.
The current structure of the federal judiciary raises another ques-
tion concerning horizontal stare decisis: what is the significance of the
way in which multi-member courts sit to decide cases? In the current
federal system, the Justices of the Supreme Court always sit all to-
gether, the judges of the courts of appeals sometimes do, and the
judges of the district courts almost never do.42 That makes things easy
for the Supreme Court and the district courts but complicated for the
courts of appeals, which routinely sit en banc. Those courts’ response
to this complication is the rule that panels are bound by an absolute
rule of stare decisis but the court sitting en banc is not.43 A more diffi-
cult question, which some of the courts of appeals may not have ad-
dressed, is whether a panel opinion has any precedential force at all
when an issue it decided is presented to the court en banc.44 No court
of appeals, however, accords absolute stare decisis effect to a panel
opinion when sitting en banc; were that the rule, the court would con-
vene en banc only to decide questions of first impression.
This is not the only way to arrange the relative roles of panels
and en banc sittings. One natural alternative would be to make en
banc precedents binding on panels without the inter-panel rule. That
approach would preserve a distinctive role for the en banc court
without enabling one panel to bind the circuit in a way that could be
rejected only through a full-court sitting. Both norms have merits and
demerits, but it is very hard to see how the Constitution bears on the
question. Yet if it provides the rules of horizontal stare decisis, it must
provide one here.
peals were created. The Shreve court went on to equivocate as to whether Circuit Courts treated
one another’s cases as persuasive or binding authority, but seems to have inclined to the view
that they were treated as binding. See id. at 791-92.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1994) (explaining that courts of appeals are generally to sit in panels
of three, although they may sit in larger panels, and may sit en banc); id. § 132 (detailing the
principle that, except as otherwise provided by statute or court rule, judicial power of district
courts may be exercised by a single judge).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the court is
bound by panel precedent unless that precedent is overruled by the Supreme Court or the Sec-
ond Circuit sitting en banc); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 134.02[1][c] (3d ed. 1997) (explaining that a published decision of a court of appeals panel is a
decision of the court and thus carries with it the force of stare decisis).
44. According to the D.C. Circuit, the en banc court will not overrule a panel precedent
simply because the panel was wrong, but is not absolutely bound by panel precedent in the way
that another panel would be. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 975
F.2d 871, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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Horizontal stare decisis also suffers from the second problem,
that familiar doctrine is hard to square with the thesis that the Consti-
tution dictates the rules. One standard principle is that stare decisis
should be stronger with respect to statutory than with respect to con-
stitutional interpretation.45 If the Constitution bears on this question
at all, however, it bears against that orthodox position. Its command
to courts concerning the Constitution and federal statutes is the same:
they are both the supreme law of the land.46 To the extent that hori-
zontal stare decisis results from the fact that courts are courts, or that
they exercise the judicial power, there is once again no source for any
distinction among sources of law.
Moreover, the same judicial power is vested in the Supreme
Court and in the inferior tribunals that Congress constitutes. The
natural inference is that if rules of stare decisis result from the nature
of courts or of the judicial power, the rules of horizontal stare decisis
should be the same for all federal courts, too. But they are not. For
reasons that are hard to identify (and that are virtually impossible to
tie to the Constitution), the federal district courts regard their own
precedents as persuasive authority only.47
Similar difficulties arise with respect to vertical stare decisis,
which determines a lower court’s obligation to follow the doctrine of
a superior court. The answer to the question of its structure and force
may seem obvious: the scope of vertical stare decisis is determined by
appellate jurisdiction and it is absolute. Surely we can attribute that
rule to the Constitution.
In fact, it is not obvious either that appellate jurisdiction deter-
mines the scope of stare decisis or that the force of vertical precedent
is absolute. On the first point, appellate jurisdiction and stare decisis,
we need to remember that for most of the country’s history the Su-
preme Court of the United States did not have appellate jurisdiction
over the entire field of federal-question cases (putting aside the other
heads of jurisdiction in Article III). First, under the Judiciary Act of
1789 and its successors, as late as 1914, the Court did not have appel-
late jurisdiction over cases in which a state court decided in favor of a
federal claim.48 Thus, in the infamous Ives case, when the New York
Court of Appeals held that New York’s workers’ compensation stat-
45. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. See 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, § 134.02[1][d].
48. See Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73.
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ute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court had no
appellate jurisdiction.49 The Court would have been able to review a
decision sustaining the New York law against federal challenge (the
kind of jurisdiction it had in Lochner v. New York50), but it had no ju-
risdiction when the federal claim prevailed. Second, for most of the
nineteenth century, the Court had no general appellate jurisdiction
over criminal convictions in the lower federal courts. The Court
could, however, address questions that arose in criminal prosecutions
under limited circumstances, including certain habeas corpus pro-
ceedings and upon certificate of division of a Circuit Court.51
While the Ives context gave rise to more practical difficulties
than did the Court’s limited jurisdiction for criminal appeals, this in-
quiry is about precedent in the federal courts, so I will consider the
problem that could have arisen in federal criminal cases. Suppose that
the Supreme Court, presented with a certificate of division by a Cir-
cuit Court, had interpreted a federal criminal statute in a particular
fashion. In a later case in a Circuit Court where there was no division
of opinion, was the Court’s precedent binding? If precedent follows
appellate jurisdiction the answer was no, because there was no ap-
pellate jurisdiction.52 If that answer is incorrect, then the rules of stare
decisis do not simply follow from appellate jurisdiction. They reflect
some other principle not mentioned by the Constitution.
The Ives problem concerns the scope of vertical stare decisis.
There is also the question of its force. Again, the assumption that its
force is absolute is more doubtful than may seem. What is a lower
court to do when it believes that the higher court would not follow
the higher court’s clear precedent? If the lower court is to do what it
thinks the higher court would do, then the rule of vertical stare decisis
is not absolute. While the Supreme Court’s current answer is that the
lower court is to follow the precedent and not predict overruling, the
49. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 298 (1911); see also Edward Hartnett, Why
Is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75
TEX. L. REV. 907, 933-37 (1997). Ives played an important role in prompting Congress to extend
the Court’s jurisdiction to include all cases from state courts that involve federal questions. See
id.
50. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
51. See supra note 32.
52. As noted, this problem was more likely to arise in the state-federal context under sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its successors. Suppose that a state court upheld a state
statute against federal challenge, and the Supreme Court, on review under section 25, affirmed.
In a later case presenting the same question, the Supreme Court would have no appellate juris-
diction over a state court judgment accepting the federal challenge and holding the state statute
invalid.
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case enunciating that rule made no attempt to ground it in the Consti-
tution, and it is not clear where in the Constitution one would point in
order so to ground it.53
One may object that constitutional norms routinely have debat-
able applications, often applications that are highly debatable pre-
cisely because the norm seems to give no guidance. The fact that
there are hard cases does not mean that there is no law. The questions
I have posed, however, are not hard, or at least should not be. They
are quite basic. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a question that would
be any easier than whether the rules are the same at different levels.
The problem here is that all the questions are hard, and all the an-
swers seem equally unrelated to the Constitution, because there is no
constitutional text or structure to apply.
2. History. Sometimes the force of historical practice may be so
strong that it must be read into the Constitution despite what
otherwise would be the natural import of the text and structure. Thus,
it is necessary to consider the possibility that rules of stare decisis are
simply built into the Article III judicial power as originally
understood. The argument would be that Americans at the time of
the Framing were so familiar with judicial stare decisis that they
simply assumed that to have a judiciary was to have precedent.
History all by itself would supply the lack of text or structure.54
53. See DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The Court
announced the rule but gave no explanation:
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken
the step of renouncing Wilko. If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court
of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.
Id. at 484. Justice Stevens, in dissent, characterized the court of appeals’ action as “an indefensi-
ble brand of judicial activism,” but did not mention the Constitution. Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (footnote omitted). Also, the Supreme Court is without means of enforcing this re-
quirement. Lower courts that violate the rule but guess right about what the Supreme Court will
do will be affirmed, while perhaps at the same time being told that they misbehaved by deciding
the case correctly.
54. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), is probably the closest thing in contemporary Su-
preme Court doctrine to a constitutional rule resting wholly on history. At stake in Alden was
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to create a cause of action for money damages
against a state, with the cause of action to operate in state court. See id. at 711-12. As the Court
explained, the provision of the text that explicitly deals with state sovereign immunity, the Elev-
enth Amendment, does not bar what Congress had done. See id. at 743. The Amendment is
formulated as a limitation on the judicial power of the United States, see U.S. CONST. amend.
XI, and it is “a truism as to the literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment” that it does not apply
in state court. Id. at 735-36. “As we have explained, however, the bare text of the Amendment is
not an exhaustive description of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit.” Id. The Court’s
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It would be odd if the text and the times that produced it were so
far to diverge that the text would give no hint about a practice that
was simply taken for granted. As just discussed, however, the Consti-
tution seems quite innocent of judicial precedent. In that respect, it
matches the times that produced it, not because Americans in the late
eighteenth century were unfamiliar with precedent, but because they
were familiar with judicial practices that hardly matched any constitu-
tional obligation on the part of courts to follow their prior decisions.
Courts would have had a hard time doing that, because their informa-
tion about their prior cases was at best unsystematic and often non-
existent. Reports of American decisions were few, unofficial, and of-
ten unreliable.55 The infrastructure of judge-made law with which we
are so familiar was not yet in place, so it would have been unreason-
able to find in the Constitution a requirement that judge-made law be
followed.
It also is unlikely that there was widespread agreement as to
norms of vertical precedent when the Constitution was adopted, be-
cause judicial structures were very much in flux. While the Constitu-
tion provides for one supreme federal court and inferior federal
courts, the hierarchical judicial structure that we know so well was
only beginning to come into focus. As Ritz explains, when the Consti-
tution was being framed and ratified, the highest judicial tribunal in
eleven of the thirteen states was primarily a trial court; appellate re-
view was at best a secondary function.56 The allocation of judicial
authority was primarily horizontal, among different courts, rather
than vertical with a clear appellate hierarchy.57 It is hard to imagine
that people familiar with such judiciaries thought that rules about ver-
tical stare decisis were part and parcel of the judicial power, because
it is hard to imagine that they had firmly settled views about judicial
structures they had never seen.
earlier explanation consisted of a little structure, see id. at 748-52, and a lot of history, see id. at
745-48.
55. Wilfred Ritz investigated in detail the beginnings of modern law-reporting systems in
the states, which he defines as a system “in which the decisions of a court, and the reasons for
the decisions, are published on a regular and timely basis, so as to be generally available to all
courts, the legal profession, and the public.” WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW
EVIDENCE 46 (1990). He dates the earliest such systems, for New York and the Supreme Court
of the United States, to 1804. Georgia did not have one until 1847. See id. at 47.
56. See id. at 36.
57. See id. at 44.
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This is not to deny that Americans at the time of the Framing
expected courts generally to follow precedent. They did.58 I do mean
to deny that during the Framing era the idea of judicial power was
thought logically to imply the creation of precedent. As I will explain
presently, the force of precedent came, not from anything intrinsic to
the judicial power, but from the common law rules of stare decisis.
If I am right on this point, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recently went badly wrong when it addressed the
constitutional status of stare decisis. In Anastasoff v. United States,59
the Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional its internal rule under which
unpublished panel opinions have no precedential weight. The court
concluded that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution considered these
principles [of stare decisis] to derive from the nature of judicial
power,”60 so that the court was constitutionally required to give
precedential weight to one of its prior unpublished opinions. Anasta-
soffs claim about the meaning of the term judicial power, although it
may seem innocuous, is very strong. It implies, for example, that an
American lawyer around the time of the Framing would have as-
serted that civil law tribunals, which did not have the common law
doctrine of precedent, were exercising something other than judicial
power.61 The case cites no one who employed that usage of “judicial
58. Brutus, probably the most penetrating Anti-Federalist critic of the proposed constitu-
tions judicial system, expected that the projected federal courts would rely on their earlier deci-
sions. He painted a disturbing picture, in which the courts would quietly expand federal power
through a series of adjudications in low-profile lawsuits:
They will be able to extend the limits of the general government gradually, and by in-
sensible degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people. Their
decisions on the meaning of the constitution will commonly take place in cases which
arise between individuals, with which the public will not be generally acquainted; one
adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this to a following one.
Letter of Brutus in the New York Journal (Mar. 20, 1788), in XVI JOHN P. KAMINSKI &
GASPARE J. SALADINO, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 434 (1986).
59. No. 99-3917EM, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000).
60. Id. at *8.
61. Blackstone recognized that judicial lawmaking through the rule of stare decisis was a
distinctive feature of the English common law. After summarizing his discussion of custom en-
shrined in judicial decisions as the “chief corner stone of the laws of England,” he explained that
“[t]he Roman law, as practiced in the time of it’s [sic] liberty, paid also a great regard to custom;
but not so much as our law.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73. For an example
of a civil law jurisdiction that did not have the English rules of precedent, Blackstone would
have had to look no further than the north of the Kingdom of Great Britain, which as he recog-
nized had its own legal system distinct from that of England. See id. at *98 (“[T]he municipal or
common laws of England are, generally speaking, of no force or validity in Scotland . . . .”). In
Blackstone’s time, Scotland did not have the English doctrine of precedent. T.B. Smith, re-
counting the history of stare decisis in Scotland, described the Scottish approach to judicial
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power,” and I am not aware of anyone who did. Blackstone did not.62
Nor did Alexander Hamilton, who as Publius wrote as if the courts of
all legal systems had judicial power, whether or not they followed
common law principles of stare decisis.63
authority: “the citing of precedents was well established in Scotland in eighteenth century prac-
tice,” and “the judges, while not regarding themselves as bound by their previous decisions,
tended to follow them if satisfied that they were sound and had established a practice.” T.B.
SMITH, THE DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT IN SCOTS LAW 10 (1952). That is not stare
decisis as practiced at Westminster Hall. According to Smith, “[i]t was in the nineteenth century
that doctrines of stare decisis began to take root in the Scottish system.” Id.
62. For example, Blackstone referred to the fact that the French had “vested their judicial
power in their parliaments, a body separate and distinct from both the legislative and execu-
tive,” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *269, without suggesting that French courts followed
English principles of stare decisis. In the third volume of the Commentaries there is a chapter
“Of Courts in General.” 3 id. at *22. In it, Blackstone described the fundamental features of the
judiciary:
In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus, and judex:
the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of the injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is
called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to
examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law arising upon that fact, and, if any
injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by its officers supply the remedy.
3 id. at *25. Blackstone’s interchange of the Latin word judex and the English phrase judicial
power suggests that he understood the latter in a generic sense that would include the case-
deciding authority of any government, whether or not it followed precedent.
Elsewhere Blackstone also seems not to have believed that judicial power entails stare
decisis. He explained:
The original power of judicature, by the fundamental principles of society, is lodged
in the society at large: but as it would be impracticable to render complete justice to
every individual, by the people in their collective capacity, therefore every nation has
committed that power to certain select magistrates, who with more ease and expedi-
tion can hear and determine complaints; and in England this authority has immemo-
rially been exercised by the king or his substitutes.
1 id. at *266-67. All nations, whether or not their courts follow precedent, thus have the “power
of judicature.” Maybe Blackstone meant to distinguish between the power of judicature and the
judicial power, but the index entry on “judicial power” refers to this page, on which the words
“judicial power” do not appear, but “power of judicature” does, 4 id. at Index.
63. “If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be marked among the number.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Hamilton did
not pause to explain that his axiom did not apply to governments where the courts do not follow
precedent because such governments have no judicial power.
Pierre DuPonceau, a prominent member of the Philadelphia bar in the early national
period, also apparently used the term “judicial power” without meaning to confine it to systems
with precedent. In his 1824 lectures on federal jurisdiction, DuPonceau said:
Jurisdiction, in its most general sense, is the power to make, declare, or apply the law;
when confined to the judiciary department, it is what we denominate the judicial
power. It is the right of administering justice through the laws, by the means which
the laws have provided for that purpose.
PIERRE S. DUPONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (1824). He did not mention setting
or following precedent. See id.
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The case’s implausible claim about Framing-era language use
arises from two errors. One mistake is fairly straightforward: deduc-
ing from the expectation that courts would follow precedent a belief
that being a court logically entails following precedent. Blackstone
did state that courts follow precedent.64 He also stated that “in some
cases, (as in proof of any general customs, or matters of common tra-
dition or repute,) the courts admit of hearsay evidence.”65 But the
hearsay rule and its exceptions are not built into the judicial power.
More subtle is the second mistake. As the Eighth Circuit ex-
plains, around the time of the Framing some commentators main-
tained that adherence to precedent would help keep the judicial
power within its proper sphere: bound by precedent, courts would be
less likely to read their policy views into the law and thereby encroach
on the legislative power.66 Stare decisis thus would reinforce the con-
stitutional structure, helping to keep the judiciary from in effect exer-
cising legislative authority. From that belief the court of appeals in
Anastasoff inferred a belief that stare decisis was logically implied by
the grant to the courts of only the judicial power. Again, the inference
is unwarranted. Hamilton also maintained that life tenure, with re-
moval only through impeachment, would reinforce the constitutional
structure by strengthening judicial independence.67 Life tenure thus
would help keep the legislature from in effect exercising judicial
authority. Hamilton nevertheless knew better than to believe that
every court with judicial power therefore has life-tenured judges; he
distrusted the state courts precisely because many of them did not.68
64. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *69.
65. 3 id. at *368.
66. Anastasoff cites Blackstone and Hamilton for the proposition that adherence to prece-
dent will keep the judiciary within its proper bounds. See Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-
3917EM, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 21179, at *10-14. Hamilton did say that. See FEDERALIST NO. 78,
at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (asserting that, to avoid arbitrary dis-
cretion in the courts, the judiciary must be “bound down by strict rules and precedents”). Black-
stone did not, at least not in the passage cited in Anastasoff. That discussion is indeed about the
separation of powers, but it is not about precedent. Rather, Blackstone’s point is that judicial
independence secures judicial adherence to “certain and established rules, which the crown it-
self cannot now alter but by act of parliament.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *267 (foot-
note omitted). The rule of law and the rule of cases are not the same.
67. Hamilton maintained that life tenure would keep the judges from an “improper com-
plaisance” with the branch that would reappoint them were their terms shorter. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 66, at 529.
68. “State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too
little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.” Id. NO. 81,
at 547.
HARRISON IN FINAL READ
2000] POWER OF CONGRESS OVER PRECEDENT 525
It is highly unlikely that when the Constitution was adopted
Americans believed that the principle of stare decisis was hard-wired
into the concept of judicial power. There were norms of precedent,
but they were principles of general jurisprudence, no more fixed by
the Constitution than is the law of admiralty. The next section elabo-
rates this view.
C. The Source of Current Rules of Precedent
Norms of stare decisis that the federal courts follow cannot plau-
sibly be attributed to the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, those
courts claim to follow such rules, and I am assuming that stare decisis
is part of the body of rules and principles that the courts are bound to
apply on pain of being lawless. The rules of precedent must be some
kind of law.
One could reach what I will suggest is the correct answer through
process of elimination. As just discussed, it is very hard to find rules
of precedent in the Constitution.69 It would be even harder to find
them in a treaty. And while the federal courts sometimes are obliged
to follow the substantive law of a state, that state could not regulate
their internal operations.70 That leaves two possibilities. Norms of
stare decisis could be general law (as it is now known, federal com-
mon law), or they could result from federal statutes. There is good
reason to believe that most of what we know as the law of precedent
in federal court is general law, while some of it comes from the courts’
reading of the applicable statutory rules.
General Law. Federal courts sometimes follow principles of deci-
sion that are not constitutional, statutory, treaty-based, or found in
the law of one of the United States or any foreign country. The right
name of those principles is a matter of some difficulty, but their exis-
tence is not. From their foundation, the federal courts have applied
decisional principles that do not come from written federal law or
from the states, for example, in the exercise of their admiralty juris-
69. See supra Part I.B.
70. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802 (1995) (stating that the Con-
stitution prevents the states from imposing congressional qualifications additional to those in its
text; such authority is not within the states’ pre–Tenth Amendment “original powers”); Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965) (holding that in a civil action in federal court where juris-
diction rests on diversity of citizenship, service of process shall be made pursuant to Federal
Civil Rule of Procedure 4(d)(1), not according to state law); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (explaining that the states lack power, by taxation or otherwise, to con-
trol the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to implement the powers
vested in the national government).
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diction. The Supreme Court applies unwritten norms that are not
state law when it decides cases between states in its original jurisdic-
tion.71
Like other commentators, I regard admiralty and interstate law
as leading examples of the category of general or federal common
law.72 Whether one says that the federal courts were applying general
or federal common law in diversity cases before Erie depends on the
interpretation one places on the system associated with Swift v. Ty-
son.73 According to one account, the applicable norms varied from
state court to federal court because the federal courts independently
interpreted the law of the states.74 According to another account, fed-
eral courts diverged from state courts because federal courts were
following a choice-of-law rule that sometimes told them to apply the
general law conceived of as a body of rules and principles separate
from the law of any state. At times, Swift itself seems to take this ap-
proach, as when it points out that the question at stake is not gov-
erned by a New York statute or a fixed local usage peculiar to New
York, but rather by general principles of commercial law.75 Only the
71. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 883, 915-17 (1986). Professor Field, like many others, moves easily from the ob-
servation that the law of admiralty and the law governing interstate disputes is neither state law
nor written federal law to the conclusion that it is judge-made, which in turn leads her to the
conclusion that the federal courts have some lawmaking power. See id. The primary scholarly
challenge to this reasoning comes from Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996), who rejects the deduction of judicial power to
make law by challenging the premise that the applicable norms do not come from written fed-
eral law. Professor Clark argues, for example, that the norms that govern interstate cases come
from the Constitution’s principle of state equality. See id. at 1322-31.
Understanding admiralty and interstate law as general law avoids attributing legislative
power to the courts in the literal sense. It assimilates the account of judicial policymaking where
there is no written law to the standard account of judicial policymaking that fills in gaps in writ-
ten law. In both instances, there is an applicable norm that is given to the courts by an outside
source but that is not fully determinate in its application. In my view, judicial legislation is a
metaphor based on the very real similarities between that process and what legislatures do. It is
not to be taken literally. If the question is whether the federal courts have any legislative power
strictly speaking, my answer is of course not, simply because the Constitution vests all the legis-
lative power it grants in Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Including unwritten principles of
general law in the range of norms that courts at once apply and shape makes it possible to treat
judicial legislation as a metaphor throughout the federal courts’ jurisdiction, including their ju-
risdiction over admiralty and interstate disputes.
72. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 345 (1992)
(noting that admiralty and interstate cases are decided under federal common law).
73. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
74. See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883) (stating that, in the application of
state laws in cases where jurisdiction is based on diversity, federal courts must use their own
judgments in interpreting those laws).
75. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
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latter approach involves general law in the sense in which I am using
the term. I will use the term general law to emphasize that the norms
involved are authoritative and binding on the courts and hence, al-
though in some sense made by judges, are not made just as judges
please.
Dominant judicial understandings of the place of general law in
the American legal hierarchy have changed over time. Admiralty is
the leading example. In exercising their admiralty jurisdiction, the
federal courts have always employed legal rules and standards that
are not necessarily the law of any state or foreign country and that do
not come from written federal law. That is as true today as it was in
1795. At least since Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,76 however, admi-
ralty law has been treated as federal law for purposes of the Suprem-
acy Clause.77 It was not so treated during the nineteenth century.
Rather, it had the same status as the general commercial law: federal
courts would apply it pursuant to choice of law rules, but it did not
override inconsistent state law, and state court decisions based on it
were not subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States
under section 25 of the Judiciary Act, which gave the Court appellate
jurisdiction only over federal question cases.78 For present purposes, it
is unnecessary to make much of this development, because I will be
considering norms of precedent only as they are applied by federal
courts. Hence, the status of those norms relative to state law is an is-
sue that need not be addressed.
Norms of general law have several features which are illustrated
by the law of admiralty. First, general law norms are unwritten, which
follows from their status as neither state, foreign, nor written federal
76. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
77. See id. at 215.
78. “A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828). The older under-
standing of the general law is presented in lucid detail in William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). Judge Fletcher’s leading example of the status of general law is the
law of marine insurance, which as he explains was found to be within the admiralty jurisdiction
first by Justice Story on circuit, see De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.
3776), and eventually by the Supreme Court, Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 35
(1870). While most American judges in the first part of the nineteenth century appear to have
agreed that a uniform body of marine insurance doctrine would be valuable, the status of ma-
rine insurance as a subject of the general commercial law presented a serious obstacle: because
the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction over marine insurance cases in the state courts,
uniformity could be achieved only by conscious coordination among independent jurisdictions.
See Fletcher, supra, at 1558-75.
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law.79 Second, they are authoritative rules in the sense that the courts
are bound to apply them just as they are bound to apply federal stat-
utes or state law.80 Third, despite the second feature, they are to some
extent judge-made in that the norms are formulated at a sufficiently
high level of abstraction as to require the exercise of some policy
judgment in their application.81 The second and third features of gen-
eral law are no more and no less inconsistent with one another in this
context than in any other. Even in the absence of stare decisis, courts
make law in the sense with which we are familiar when they resolve a
concrete dispute on the basis, for example, of a federal statute, the
gaps in which they fill in part by reference to their views of desirable
policy.82 When a legal norm has gaps, there is no contradiction be-
tween saying that it is binding on the courts in that they fail of their
duty in not applying it, and that it admits of judicial lawmaking in that
the courts properly fill the gaps in part by reference to their views as
to proper results. A norm that a court felt free simply to disregard
79. One leading source notes:
The “general” maritime law in the United States, insofar as it remains unmodified by
statute, contains, then, two parts. First, is the corpus of traditional rules and concepts
found by our courts in the European authorities . . . . Second are rules and concepts
improvised to fit the needs of this country, including, of course, modifications of the
first component.
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 47 (2d ed. 1975); see
also Fletcher, supra note 78, at 1517 (“The law merchant, usually described as part of the com-
mon law, was the general law governing transactions among merchants in most of the trading
nations of the world. The maritime law was an even more comprehensive and eclectic general
law than the law merchant.”).
80. It may be more exact to say that the general law applied in federal courts was and is as
authoritative and as binding as the ordinary private law of most states insofar as that law is not
contained in statutory codifications. I agree with Justice Holmes that those rules are authorita-
tive law, and that they are more absolutely binding and less subject to judicial revision the more
abstractly they are conceived. Perhaps a state’s highest court could properly reject the doctrine
of consideration, but it still would be lawless for one to reject the very principle of the obligation
of contract, holding that private bargains are not to be enforced by the government. Admiralty
law was and is binding in this fashion, and indeed Holmes’s aphorism about molar and molecu-
lar motions was delivered in Jensen, an admiralty case. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. Probably the most prominent recent example of a case in which the courts reshaped
substantive admiralty law is Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970), in
which the Court rejected its earlier doctrine that admiralty law knew no remedy for wrongful
death. (Although now 30 years old, Moragne is recent by the standards of the admiralty.)
82. This formulation follows that of H.L.A. Hart:
[I]n any legal system there will always be certain legally unregulated cases in which on
some point no decision either way is dictated by the law and the law is accordingly
partly indeterminate or incomplete. If in such cases the judge is to reach a decision . . .
he must exercise his discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying
already pre-existing settled law.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 272 (2d ed. 1994).
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would not be binding and in any application would be wholly judge-
made because its application would result entirely from judicial
choice and not at all from legal compulsion. Fourth, they originate in
custom, both private and judicial. The law of admiralty comes from
the practices of maritime traders and the courts of maritime coun-
tries.83 Finally, general law is like state law in that it is hierarchically
inferior to written federal law. When Congress, in an exercise of one
of its enumerated powers, legislates on an issue previously controlled
by general law, Congress’s rule prevails.84
The norms of precedent as the federal courts know them consist
mainly of unwritten principles that are characterized as binding law
but that reflect substantial judicial input, custom, and practice. Those
are the hallmarks of general law. As one would expect, given its ori-
gins, courts and commentators have understood the general principle
of stare decisis, the high-level abstraction from which the particular
norms of precedent are developed, as a principle of the common law.
Justice Curtis, for example, referred to “the maxim of the common
law, stare decisis.”85 Of the same opinion was the venerable Judge
Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut, pioneer of American treatise-
83. Gilmore and Black discuss the origins of maritime law in custom in their treatise. See
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 79, at 3-11. Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance, just
after stating that admiralty is not federal law, see supra note 78, explained that “the law, admi-
ralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.”
American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546. More recently the Supreme Court has noted that
“[m]aritime law, the common law of seafaring men, provides an established network of rules
and distinctions that are practically suited to the necessities of the sea.” United States v. Webb,
Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 191 (1970).
84. The Jensen episode is the best-known admiralty example. Jensen held that because ad-
miralty was federal law, the states could not replace its traditional rules of employer liability
with a no-fault system of workers’ compensation. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217-18. The Court also
rejected Congress’s attempts to authorize state legislation in the field, see Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164
(1920), but the former case made clear that the problem was one of delegation, not of the immu-
tability of maritime law in the face of legislation by the appropriate legislature, see W.C. Daw-
son & Co., 264 U.S. at 227-28. In response, Congress adopted its own scheme of workers’ com-
pensation, which abrogated the traditional admiralty rules about employer liability. See Long-
shoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. (1994)).
85. Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275, 286 (1850) (concluding that dicta of
a state court is not controlling as precedent). In similar fashion, Chief Judge Drake of the Court
of Claims in 1873 noted that “[o]ne of the foundation-stones of common-law jurisprudence is
the maxim stare decisis.” Thompson v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 187, 199 (1873) (Drake, C.J., dis-
senting); see also Palmer’s Adm’r v. Mead, 7 Conn. 149, 158 (1828) (“There is not in the com-
mon law a maxim more eminently just, and promotive of the public convenience, than that of
stare decisis.”).
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writing.86 Norms of this sort are not intrinsically resistant to congres-
sional modification.
2. Stare Decisis and the Statutory Structure of the Courts of
Appeals. The rules of stare decisis in the federal courts of appeals are
slightly complicated. Those tribunals can decide cases in panels,
generally consisting of three judges, or in en banc sittings that include
a larger group, usually all of the judges in regular active service.87 All
the courts of appeals maintain that very different rules of stare decisis
apply depending whether the court is sitting as a panel or en banc.
Panels are absolutely bound by the courts’ precedents. En banc
sittings are not. The different circuits may disagree as to the
precedential weight that the en banc court is to accord to prior panel
opinions, and some of them may have no explicit doctrine on this
subject. All, however, agree that a panel precedent does not
absolutely bind an en banc sitting the way it binds another panel.88
Panel opinions must have less than absolutely binding force in en
banc sittings if those sittings are to perform the function of enabling a
majority of the judges in regular active service to determine the
court’s doctrine. Were en banc courts bound by panel precedent as
panels are bound, they would be able to establish case law only when
deciding questions of first impression. That would interfere substan-
tially with the full court’s control of doctrine.
According to the Supreme Court, the principle that a majority of
the full court of appeals is supposed to be able to control its doctrine
is derived from the statutes setting up the courts of appeals and ena-
bling them to sit both in panels and en banc. In 1960, the Supreme
Court faced the question whether, under the structural statutes as
they then stood, a circuit judge’s vote should be counted in an en banc
proceeding when the judge had taken senior status between the en
86. See 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 9
(1822) (“[S]tare decisis is a fundamental maxim of the common law.”).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1994). All but two of the courts of appeals sit either in three-judge
panels or all together. The Federal Circuit is authorized to sit in “panels of more than three
judges,” id. § 46(c), and en banc sittings of the Ninth Circuit normally consist of the chief judge
and ten judges chosen by lot. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
88. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, ¶ 134.02[1][c]. To say that en banc sittings are not
absolutely bound as panels is not to say that they are subject to no rule of stare decisis. The D.C.
Circuit, for example, takes the position that when it sits en banc, its existing panel precedent is
entitled to some respect as a matter of stare decisis but is not absolutely binding. See, e.g., Criti-
cal Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n., 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(holding that while one panel may not overrule another, an en banc court may overrule a panel
on a question of law if the earlier decision was fundamentally flawed).
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banc hearing and entry of judgment by the full court. The Court said
no. It found the entry of judgment to be the crucial moment, and at
that moment the senior judge was not a judge in regular active serv-
ice. He therefore should not have participated in shaping the court’s
doctrine because “the evident policy of the statute was to provide
‘that the active circuit judges shall determine the major doctrinal
trends of the future for their court.’”89
The federal judiciary’s current rules of precedent cannot plausi-
bly be attributed to the Constitution. Most of them are general law, or
in the current phrase, federal common law. At least one of them, says
the Supreme Court, is deduced from statutory policy. General law
and statutes are not, by reason of their place in the legal hierarchy,
immune from congressional alteration.
II. THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER
STARE DECISIS
Whether Congress has power to legislate concerning precedent
in federal court depends on the answers to two further questions.
First is whether there is an affirmative grant of authority that fits the
bill. Second is whether any seeming grant is fool’s gold because it
would be inconsistent with the separation of legislative and judicial
power. The natural objection to congressional power over stare deci-
sis is the concern that such a power would enable the legislature to
control doctrine and case outcomes so as to constitute an invasion of
the judicial sphere.
As this part explains, it is not difficult to sketch a congressional
power over stare decisis that flows naturally from the Necessary and
Proper Clause and that does not threaten judicial independence:
Congress may act on the basis of the courts’ own traditional criteria
for fashioning rules of precedent and must, like the courts, respect the
principle that norms of stare decisis must be adopted on their sys-
temic merits, not in order to produce particular outcomes. Moreover,
a power over stare decisis limited by this principle would pose no
threat to the judicial power. Rules of stare decisis are justified on the
basis of their systemic effects, for example, with respect to stability in
the law, and emphatically not with respect to their effects on particu-
lar doctrinal disputes. To adopt or apply a rule of precedent in order
89. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 690 (1960) (quoting Chief
Judge Clark’s dissenting opinion in the lower-court decision under review, American-Foreign
S.S. Corp. v. United States, 265 F. 2d 136, 155 (2d Cir. 1958)).
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to reach a doctrinal result, let alone in order to make a particular law-
suit come out for the plaintiff or defendant, is illicitly to manipulate
the concept of precedent. Thus, when legislating on the basis of the
courts’ well-established criteria for rules of precedent, Congress
would not be legislating with an eye to results and would not be
seeking to take over the judicial power.
A. Congressional Power Under the Necessary and Proper Clause
Throughout their long experience with stare decisis, American
judges and commentators have explained why rules of stare decisis
are a good idea and suggested criteria with which to evaluate them. In
the process they have provided almost ready-made an explanation of
why Congress, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, may
legislate in this field. Every argument in favor of a rule of stare decisis
is an argument that such a rule would lead to improved performance
of the judicial function; Congress’s necessary and proper power is
precisely the power to provide those rules that will enable the other
two branches to do their jobs more effectively.90
90. The presence of the Necessary and Proper Clause makes it easy to reject another pos-
sible objection to congressional action in this area. The objection would be that the courts have
power to adopt rules of precedent, not in the lawmaking capacity that comes with their function
of deciding cases, but in the lawmaking capacity they exercise when they adopt rules of proce-
dure outside of the context of any case. One might think, that is, that although formulation of
stare decisis norms is indeed an exercise of genuinely legislative power, this is an exception to
the vesting of the legislative power in Congress, just as the impeachment provisions are an ex-
ception to the vesting of judicial power in the courts. If the courts have this little bit of the leg-
islative power, Congress may not exercise it, any more than a court may decide whether to con-
vict and remove a civil officer who has been impeached by the House of Representatives. What-
ever power the courts may have to adopt genuinely legislative rules of procedure in the absence
of congressional action, the position that they may do so contrary to an act of Congress cannot
be sustained. Rules of procedure are necessary and proper to carry into execution the judicial
power, and the authority to adopt laws of that description is explicitly vested in Congress. That
explicit grant prevails over any implicit grant to the courts, especially where the latter would
constitute an exception to the structure created by the Vesting Clauses (This expresio unius
point is central to Professor Van Alstyne’s argument, in his fundamental article on Congress’s
authority to carry the other two powers into execution, that the scope of “inherent” executive
and judicial authority is limited by the fact that Congress is given power to do what is necessary
to make the executive and judicial powers function best. See William Van Alstyne, The Role of
Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Com-
ment on the Horizontal Effect of “The Sweeping Clause,” 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 793-94 (1975).).
Consistent with this reasoning, Congress has been adopting rules of procedure for the courts or
authorizing them to do so since the Judiciary Act of 1789. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
XX, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (authorizing retrials “for reasons for which new trials have usually been
granted in the courts of law” and empowering the courts “to make and establish all necessary
rules for the orderly conducting [of] business in the said courts, provided such rules are not re-
pugnant to the laws of the United States”). The Court has recognized that Congress’s power
trumps any inherent judicial authority to adopt rules of procedure. See Palermo v. United
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Consider the basic argument in favor of some form of horizontal
stare decisis. If one believes that the incremental process of lawmak-
ing through cases is a good way of aggregating dispersed information
into a correct answer, then precedent should be followed.91 If earlier
cases are generally right, then it is a waste of effort to require the
courts to reinvent the doctrinal wheel every time an issue comes be-
fore them, and having a rule that they should be followed will econo-
mize on judicial resources.92 And if one believes that stability in doc-
trine is valuable to the legal system, independent of legal accuracy,
one may well believe that it is worth sacrificing some of the latter to
obtain the former.93 Horizontal stare decisis is a good idea, goes the
argument, because rules of precedent will enable the courts to pro-
vide generally accurate and stable legal rules while economizing on
scare decisional resources.94
Rules of stare decisis enable the courts better to achieve their
purpose, which means that such rules would carry the judicial power
into execution. The power to do that is placed in Congress’s hands by
States, 360 U.S. 343, 353-54 n.11 (1959) (“The power of this Court to prescribe rules of proce-
dure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Con-
gress.”).
91. Judge Easterbrook has argued that precedent disperses decisionmaking through indi-
vidual cases, economizes on information, washes out judicial idiosyncrasies, and so increases the
likelihood that precedent will be correct. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in
Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 423 (1988).
92. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987) (arguing that the
rule-like nature of stare decisis saves judicial time).
93. It is a commonplace that stability and predictability are central reasons for adherence
to precedent. “The ‘interest in stability and orderly development of the law’ that undergirds the
doctrine of stare decisis, therefore counsels adherence to settled precedent.” Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976)) (refusing to overturn a previous Supreme Court decision that held
a state could not require an out-of-state mail-order house without representatives or outlets in
the state to collect taxes on goods purchased in the state). Moreover, some judges appeal to
those considerations in arguing for more particular principles of precedent. Consider, for exam-
ple, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60
(1993). The case involved the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which Scalia believes to
have been a mistake as an original matter and to which he adheres only for reasons of stare de-
cisis. See id. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring). He has announced his willingness to apply the part of
the doctrine that he believes to be clear for reasons of stare decisis. See id. at 78-79 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In Itel, however, he explained that he was unwilling to apply multifactor or bal-
ancing tests despite the precedents supporting them. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Adherence
to precedent is good, he argued, because it makes for stability and predictability, but vague and
unpredictable tests cannot provide stability and predictability and therefore do not deserve
strong respect as precedents. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. The rule-like nature of stare decisis, under which precedent is followed even when, all
things considered, it would not be followed in the absence of the rule, makes an independent
contribution to judicial economy. It relieves the courts of the obligation they otherwise would
have to make sure, every time, that last year’s wheel was indeed round.
HARRISON IN FINAL READ
534 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:503
the Necessary and Proper Clause.95 As Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained, when the people gave the national government “those great
powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends,” they
also gave Congress authority “to insure, as far as human prudence
could insure, their beneficial execution.”96 Like the Constitution,
Marshall did not confine Congress to carrying into execution its own
powers. His examples of legislation that had been adopted under the
Necessary and Proper Clause included “the punishment of the crimes
of stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court of the United
States, or of perjury in such court,” laws that he found “certainly con-
ducive to the due administration of justice.”97 David Currie points out
that a number of provisions of the first federal crimes act, including
the perjury provision that Marshall cited in M’Culloch and the ban on
bribing federal judges, “were plainly necessary and proper to the op-
eration of the federal courts.”98 More recently, the Supreme Court has
confirmed that Congress’s necessary and proper power extends to
providing for the internal operation of the federal courts by adopting
rules of procedure.99 Just as the White House staff enables the presi-
dent better to exercise the executive power, rules of precedent enable
the courts better to exercise the judicial power.
We can more clearly understand how rules of precedent would
be a natural exercise of the necessary and proper power, and how the
judgments Congress could make in employing that power would re-
semble those now made by the courts themselves, by examining some
of the issues that currently arise with respect to stare decisis. That ex-
amination will illustrate how the weight of the considerations under-
lying norms of precedent varies from context to context, and so
95. That Clause gives Congress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution [its own powers and] the foregoing Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
96. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
97. Id. at 417. In discussing those statutes Marshall focused on the more specific point that,
although conducive to the due administration of justice, they are not absolutely necessary to it:
“But courts may exist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though such crimes es-
cape punishment.” Id. In similar fashion, courts can and do function without following prece-
dent, but proponents of stare decisis maintain that they function better with it.
98. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801, at 96-97 (1997).
99. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“For the constitutional provision for a
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congres-
sional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts . . . .”).
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creates room for the kind of judgment Congress elsewhere exercises
when it acts to carry out the powers of the other two branches.100
The ramified structure of the federal judiciary regularly affects
the weight of the considerations underlying stare decisis. District
courts are generally one-judge tribunals staffed with judges who spe-
cialize in applying the law and supervising litigation, not in the resolu-
tion of doctrinal tangles. Thus, a district court may be less likely to re-
solve a difficult legal question correctly than is a collegial body made
up of specialists in doctrine, and therefore it may be appropriate that
district court decisions have only persuasive authority. On the other
hand, the need for stability may override these considerations, or may
do so to some extent; one reasonably could favor some rule of stare
decisis for district court opinions, perhaps a weaker rule than is fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to its
own precedents. Depending on how Congress evaluated these con-
siderations, it could keep the current rule or modify it.
In a similar fashion, the complicated structure of the courts of
appeals gives rise to many interactions among the basic desiderata
and hence to many possible rules of stare decisis. Perhaps the most
fundamental question is whether the federal appellate courts should
be treated as one tribunal or several for purposes of precedent. Cur-
rently they are treated as several. While that may reflect simple his-
torical accident, someone asked to provide a justification probably
would say that a single three-judge panel should not have the power
that comes with setting nationwide precedent. That is a reasonable
position, but it is also one from which Congress reasonably could de-
part, striking a different balance. Treating the courts of appeals as
one court would produce nationwide uniformity and enhance predict-
100. A closely related example of congressional action under the horizontal sweeping power
that balances competing considerations comes in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which rou-
tinely do so. Rule 407, for example, limits the admissibility of remedial measures taken after an
accident. See FED. R. EVID. 407. While such measures may indeed be indicators of prior negli-
gence, admitting them as evidence would deter defendants from increasing safety. As the Court
has explained:
Much of the law of evidence and of discovery is concerned with limitations on a
party’s right to have access to, and to admit in evidence, material which has probative
force. It is obviously a reasonable exercise of power over the rules of procedure and
evidence for Congress to determine that only statements of the sort described in [the
statutory provision at issue] are sufficiently reliable or important for purposes of im-
peachment [of a witness] to justify a requirement that the Government turn them
over to the defense.
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 n.11 (1959) (holding that the sole standard that con-
trols production of a government’s witness in a case is 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994)).
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ability. Whether the costs of concentrated power would be too high is
a legitimate subject for debate. Federal Circuit panels currently set
nationwide precedent, and Ninth Circuit panels set precedent for a
population several times that of the United States when the Constitu-
tion was adopted. If a compromise were desirable, Congress could di-
rect the courts of appeals to give one another’s decisions strong but
not absolute precedential force.
Another familiar complexity involves the stare decisis rules for
courts that are authorized to sit in panels of varying size. These days,
the rules of precedent reflect the assumption that the authority to de-
velop doctrine is vested in the court as a whole, and that smaller
groups of judges are agents of the full court. The rule of absolute in-
ter-panel stare decisis also may reflect the view that inaction by the
full court is equivalent to endorsement of what a panel has done, so
that only the full court (or a group large enough to reflect its views
more accurately than would a panel) may overrule an earlier decision.
Once again, the current rules are not the only way to arrange
matters. Congress could decide that the en banc mechanism is too
unwieldy to justify the gains, if there are any, from having more
judges consider a point of law. It could eliminate full-court sittings
just as it has created them. It could also adjust the interpanel rules,
providing that one panel could overrule another if some standard
were met, or that panels are bound only by en banc precedent. The
latter rule would reverse the current presumption that inaction by the
full court constitutes endorsement of the prior rule and replace it with
the presumption that the current full court will agree with a current
panel unless it indicates otherwise. All of these rules reflect varying
resolutions of the trade-offs among stability, accuracy, and efficiency.
Any reasonable trade-off would be calculated to enable the courts
better to perform their function. For that reason, any rule a court sen-
sibly could adopt, Congress could adopt pursuant to the necessary
and proper power.101
One more wrinkle in the current regime illustrates how standard
arguments for some rules of precedent are readily transferred to the
necessary and proper power. While the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction
101. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421:
But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers
are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high du-
ties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
HARRISON IN FINAL READ
2000] POWER OF CONGRESS OVER PRECEDENT 537
is defined in terms of issues about which that court is designed to be
expert, the jurisdiction extends to whole cases. It is thus common, for
example, for the Federal Circuit to hear appeals in cases that involve
both patent and trademark questions. But while patent law is within
the Federal Circuit’s expertise as defined by its jurisdiction, trade-
mark law is not. Current Federal Circuit practice is to decide issues
outside its special sphere according to the case law of the regional
court of appeals in which the district court sits; it thus would apply
Sixth Circuit trademark law to a case from the Northern District of
Ohio, but it would decide patent questions under its own prece-
dents.102
This rule rests on the policy in favor of uniform doctrine within
the geographic limits of the regional courts of appeals.103 It is a rela-
tive of the Erie doctrine, which is designed to enhance predictability,
in addition to reducing forum shopping. Again, the argument is that
the judicial function will be more effectively performed if the Federal
Circuit does not make any more law than it has to. Congress could
share that conclusion, or it could decide that the gains from having
another look at legal issues outweigh the costs in predictability; that
judgment may underlie the current division of the courts of appeals
into many circuits.
So far I have discussed possible modifications of current judge-
made norms of stare decisis. It is also possible to produce examples of
rules that the courts have not adopted but that Congress could. Here
too, the mode of reasoning is the mode appropriate to the Necessary
and Proper Clause, because the argument in favor of a stare decisis
norm is that it would enhance the operation of the judicial power.
The proposal of the Federal Courts Study Committee mentioned
above provides an example.104 Under that rule, when a conflict has
arisen among the circuits, the Supreme Court would transfer a case
presenting the issue to a court of appeals that had not yet addressed
it, which would decide the case en banc and set precedent for the en-
tire federal system, subject to the Court’s review. That rule of prece-
102. See, e.g., Registration Control Sys. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 807 (Fed. Cir.
1990). This practice has produced its own system of epicycles, including, for example, the ques-
tion whether the Federal Circuit will apply its own law or that of the regional courts of appeals
on “mixed” questions of patent and non-patent law. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, has
recently held that it will follow its own course in determining whether patent law conflicts with
non-patent federal law or state law. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F. 3d
1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
103. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1359.
104. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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dent would produce desirable nationwide uniformity while econo-
mizing on the Supreme Court’s time and attention. Because of the
random selection, it would not rest on any debatable judgments con-
cerning the competence of the different circuits.
Congress also could extend and refine the experiment with spe-
cialized jurisdiction represented by the Federal Circuit. It could pro-
vide that Federal Circuit precedent concerning trademark issues is to
be followed in all the other circuits, even in cases not appealable to
the Federal Circuit itself. The reasoning would be that the specialized
court has general expertise in intellectual property that derives in
large part from its patent jurisdiction. That expertise would justify a
rule of precedent that would be a half-way house between exclusive
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over trademark and the current approach.
It would be more difficult, however, for Congress to justify a rule
under which trademark cases from the Sixth Circuit, for example,
were to bind the entire federal system. Because there is nothing spe-
cial about the Sixth Circuit’s knowledge of trademark law, it is hard
to see how such a rule advances the interest in correct decisions in
addition to that of nationwide uniformity. The interest in uniformity
by itself would be just as well served by a rule under which the first
court of appeals to decide a trademark question would bind the oth-
ers. As this example suggests, the weaker the rationale for the pro-
posed rule becomes, the more difficult it is to support the rule under
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Congress is probably much more likely to tinker with the role of
the Federal Circuit than to enact general rules of horizontal stare de-
cisis, but it has the power to do so. It could abolish stare decisis alto-
gether, believing that the loss of stability is outweighed by the gains in
accuracy that come from a fresh look. Or it could set a hurdle for
overruling, requiring that the current court follow precedent unless
convinced that the precedent is erroneous to some specified degree.
Congress thus could determine how strongly the thumb of precedent
is to press down on the scale of doctrine.
In deciding whether to follow a prior case, courts often consider
factors other than the degree to which they believe the earlier case to
have been rightly or wrongly decided. For example, some cases main-
tain that the earlier rule’s administrability is an important considera-
tion.105 From time to time other factors have been suggested. Probably
105. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (re-
jecting the precedent established by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as
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the most provocative recent example is Casey, in which the Court
maintained that the case for following precedent is stronger when the
earlier decision has been the subject of considerable controversy.106
Congress could eliminate that criterion, judging for example that the
gains it promises for public confidence in the judiciary are outweighed
by the distorting effect such a rule would have on incentives for po-
litical activity. In similar fashion, it could reject the distinction be-
tween constitutional and statutory precedents that some cases have
endorsed.107
B. Congressional Power and Judicial Power
As suggested above, familiar reasoning concerning rules of
precedent also provides an answer to the central objection to my the-
sis: that a power over precedent would enable the legislature so to
control the courts’ decisions as to usurp the judicial power.108 That
objection has two variants, the first of which can be put aside fairly
easily. According to this first variant, for Congress to give the courts
rules of precedent would be for it to interfere with the judiciary’s rea-
soning process. Deciding the weight that an earlier case deserves is a
question only a court can answer.
In a sense that is correct, but not in a sense that represents a
genuine difficulty here. True enough, deciding on the weight to be
given a prior case is an exercise of the judicial function insofar as that
decision reflects the application of a rule. The rule could be, for ex-
ample, that well-established precedents are stronger than recent ones.
“unsound in principle and unworkable in practice”).
106. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“So to
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed de-
cision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.” (citation omitted)).
107. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexora-
ble command; rather it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision.’ This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction
through legislative action is practically impossible.’” (citations omitted)).
108. The contemporary case most naturally associated with this difficulty is Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), which held that Congress could not reopen damages judgments
entered by the federal courts. See id. at 240. Understood more broadly, Plaut is an instance of
the principle that Congress may not exercise the judicial power or interfere with the courts’ ex-
ercise thereof. Other cases and formulations of the principle also may come to mind. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), for example, could seem relevant because it can be taken
to stand for the proposition that the courts and not Congress have the last word on the meaning
of the Constitution. See id. at 536. I will not attempt to canvass all the possible ways of putting
the objection, however, because no case is actually on point and all the various formulations
have the same central idea: that a power over precedent would give Congress too much control
over doctrine.
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If that were the rule, to determine whether a case was well-
established or recent would be an exercise of the adjudicative func-
tion, and for a legislature to purport to make that determination
would be very problematic. But there is also a way in which deter-
mining the weight to be accorded a precedent is a legislative and not
an adjudicative function. Adopting the rule that well-established
precedents are entitled to more respect than recent ones is legislative,
as would be rejecting that rule and instead deciding that recent
precedents should have more force than old and possibly outmoded
cases. Of course, to adopt a rule is to produce the results entailed in
its applications, but that does not make every legislature a court every
time it chooses one norm over another.
More troublesome is the possibility that Congress could shape
rules of precedent so as to control doctrine in areas where it may not
legislate, especially those governed by the Constitution. Imagine, for
example, that in 1952 Congress had decided to maintain sectional
tranquility by providing that the dictum in Plessy concerning school
segregation was not to be questioned.
To say that a power may be misused, however, is by no means to
say that it does not exist. All power is subject to misuse, and virtually
any government function can be carried out irresponsibly. In order to
show that the separation of judicial and legislative power rules out
congressional legislation with regard to norms of precedent, it would
be necessary to show either that there are no unproblematic examples
of such legislation or that congressional power is so fraught with
abuse as to be inadmissible. Neither is the case. On the first point,
stare decisis as we know it consists largely of examples of rules that
reflect systemic considerations unrelated to particular doctrinal re-
sults. The basic principle itself is substantively neutral as to possible
answers because it simply embraces the judicial answer that came first
in time. To legislate in the interests of stability is no more an attempt
to control the substantive shape of the law than is the judicial practice
of following precedent that the judges now believe to have been in-
correct.109 To adopt a rule about whether and how much to follow
earlier cases is not to decide on particular outcomes.110
109. Indeed, adherence to precedent is routinely endorsed on the grounds that it enhances
judicial neutrality, which is to say decision on the basis of law rather than result. See, e.g., Payne,
501 U.S. at 827 (explaining that adherence to precedent promotes evenhanded development of
legal principles); id. at 848-49 (stating that adherence to precedent is fundamental to the rule of
law) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. I assume that the difficulty at issue would arise were Congress to seek deliberately to
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As to the second point, there is no reason to think that a congres-
sional power over precedent is likely to get out of control. It is no
more difficult here than anywhere else to enunciate permissible and
impermissible uses of the congressional power at stake, so the possi-
bility of abuse does not imply that the power must be rejected. The
systemic considerations of accuracy, economy, and stability on which
stare decisis currently rests, and the doctrines the courts have devel-
oped on the basis of those considerations, demonstrate in principle
and in practice that the power can be used in an unproblematic fash-
ion.
Problematic exercises of the power over precedent are those in
which the legislature is acting in order to influence results and not for
systemic reasons. Policing that principle, while of course sometimes
difficult, presents familiar problems which the courts are well-
equipped to address. First, legislation concerning stare decisis is not
the only context that may call for some vigilance to ensure that Con-
gress is seeking to implement the other two powers rather than exer-
cise them itself. On the contrary, that possibility is routinely in the
background when Congress legislates to carry the executive or judi-
cial powers into execution. When it establishes the military hierarchy
Congress may also seek to influence decisions that are properly left to
the commander in chief.111 Much closer to the power over stare decisis
is the power to adopt rules of evidence. Congress could draft them so
as to affect case outcomes in ways it is not supposed to.112 There is
nothing unique about precedent in this respect.
Next, the Supreme Court’s contemporary doctrinal arsenal in-
cludes a tool for detecting this kind of land-mine. Under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enforce Section 1, but
may not bind the courts with its views as to what Section 1 means.113
That distinction is clear enough in principle, but telling the two apart
shape judicial doctrine. While a rule of precedent inevitably has some effects on doctrine, caus-
ing some cases to come out as they otherwise would not, such effects cannot mean that Congress
lacks the power to adopt such a rule. The quorum rule for the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1
(1994), also can have that effect.
111. An example of a statute that likely crossed the line from implementation to interfer-
ence was a provision in the Army appropriation act for 1868 providing that all orders from the
president or secretary of war to the armed forces were to be given through the General of the
Army, then U.S. Grant. See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. clxx, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486-87.
112. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 295 n.13 (1996) (explaining that
Congress may adopt rules of evidence subject to separation of powers limitations and citing
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872)).
113. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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can be tricky. That is especially so because Congress has the power,
says the Court, to adopt prophylactic rules that forbid both actual
violations of Section 1 and otherwise innocent state action that may
be difficult to distinguish from actual violations.114 In response to this
problem, the Court has enunciated a special form of the M’Culloch
means-end analysis, one in which it carefully examines the propor-
tionality between the problem Congress is ostensibly solving by
adopting a supposed prophylactic rule and the proposed solution.115
City of Boerne thus provides a doctrinal model for examination of
rules of precedent. Such rules must be proportioned to the doctrine-
neutral, systemic considerations on which they may legitimately rest,
and not to the impermissible purpose of affecting results.
Finally, the courts’ close acquaintance with stare decisis should
reinforce their ability to separate the truly systemic from the ad hoc.
Judges appear to have no difficulty in concluding that a supposed rule
of stare decisis has been trumped up for the occasion in order to pro-
duce a result and not for the reasons normally associated with rules of
precedent. “The Court’s reliance upon stare decisis can best be de-
scribed as contrived,” Justice Scalia wrote in Casey,116 and in case
anyone somehow missed the point he went on to charge that the prin-
ciple the majority was standing by “is not a principle of law . . . but a
principle of Realpolitick.”117 The more a congressional rule of prece-
dent appears to be designed for this day and train only, the more
likely the courts will be to regard it as an impermissible intrusion on
their authority. Certainly a statute that dealt with a particular subject
matter would be very carefully examined in order to determine
whether it rested on an impermissible purpose. The courts should be
quite capable of protecting themselves from congressional incursion.
In short, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may
consult the criteria the courts consult in formulating rules of prece-
dent and may adopt any rule a court reasonably could adopt. It
114. See id. at 518.
115. Under City of Boerne, prophylactic rules adopted by Congress pursuant to Section 5
must be congruent with, and proportional to, the aim of implementing Section 1. That inquiry is
designed to ensure that Congress is genuinely enforcing, and not rewriting, the substantive pro-
visions. The City of Boerne test appears to be more stringent than the ordinary rules regarding
means-end fit under M’Culloch and its successors. The Court thus seems to be especially vigi-
lant in guarding its own institutional role against congressional incursions and no doubt would
bring that vigilance to the examination of legislative rules of stare decisis.
116. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 933 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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should not surprise us that the genuine legislative power, vested in
Congress and Congress alone by Article I, is at least as broad as the
demi-legislative power possessed by the judges.118 If there are indeed
rules of stare decisis, then it is natural that they be under the control
of the primary rulemaking body.
118. The body of the Constitution begins, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre-
sentatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
